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While many people are familiar with the phrase “made in China”, most are not familiar 
with the Chinese workers who make their products. Since the late 1980s, China’s economy has 
grown significantly due to its increased participation in the manufacturing of products for export, 
focusing largely on light manufacturing products such as consumer goods and textiles. To 
accommodate its booming manufacturing industry, China has established many Special 
Economic Zones, or SEZs, which provide special accommodations for foreign direct investment 
such as lowered taxes or lax labor laws. The factories in SEZs have labor forces comprised 
almost entirely of young rural women who migrated from the Chinese countryside to work in 
manufacturing and live in factory dorms, often leaving home for the first time.  
The participation of young rural Chinese women in light export manufacturing raises an 
ethical issue among economists, consumers, and feminists alike: is manufacturing empowering 
for the women working in factories, or exploitative? There are two main schools of thought 
regarding this subject. The first viewpoint belongs to the traditional feminist economists who 
generally believe that factory work is a hindrance in advancement for Chinese women. While 
manufacturing may provide women with higher wages than would otherwise be available to 
them, money does not counterbalance the negative impact of poor working conditions and a lack 
of public services.  
Neoclassical economists believe that rural Chinese women’s participation in light export 
manufacturing is a means to an end. While conditions are not perfect within manufacturing, 
better wages will lead to social development and growth for China, and women in particular, in 
the long run. Contemporary feminists are a subgroup of neoclassical economists who base their 
views on first-hand encounters with Chinese factory workers. They believe that traditional 
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feminist’s views are biased based on an Americanized view of feminism and empowerment, and 
that Chinese women are proud of their work. 
After exploring the literature addressing these different viewpoints, I collected data about 
manufacturing in China as well as information pertinent to women’s issues from a variety of 
sources such as the National Bureau of Statistics of China and Gapminder. I used this data to run 
three multivariate regressions, which revealed how a variety of different independent variables 
were correlated with three different dependent variables. These dependent variables were based 
on proxies for the Human Development Index, which measures growth in human development 
through life expectancy, education, and gross national income per capita.  
The results of the regressions showed that the average wages of staff and workers in 
manufacturing had a significant impact on life expectancy, women’s education, and gross 
national income per capita. Given these results, I concluded that the neoclassical economist and 
contemporary feminists are correct in their belief that the increased wages resulting from light 
export manufacturing have a positive effect on women’s social development and overall human 











Arguably one of the greatest symbols of globalization in the world economy is the 
outsourcing of light manufacturing from developed countries of the Global North, or western 
world, to the developing countries of the Global South, or eastern world. The majority of 
workers on this “global assembly line” for world production are women (Barker and Feiner, 
2004). This is certainly true in China, where rural migrant women make up the vast majority of 
factory workers producing many of the world’s electronics, toys, and clothes (Ngai, 2007). 
While migration to the urban areas of China began in the early 1970s, the rise of the migrant 
worker began in the late 1980s, when the hukou food coupon system was abolished (Shi, 2008). 
The hukou system was originally established as a mechanism to prevent mobility within China, 
but over time has loosened to allow migration, albeit with many restrictions. Since then, China 
has seen a mass migration of rural peasants, including a huge number of women, to urban areas, 
particularly in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in order to fill the need for low skill, low 
commitment labor in factories.  
Urban migration has raised the question of how beneficial, if at all, light manufacturing 
and factory work is for rural, female migrant workers in China. Two principle answers to this 
question emerge in literature written by researchers typically classified as feminist and 
neoclassical economists. Generally speaking, the feminist economist community is not confident 
in the ability of factory work to improve the economic and social capabilities of the rural women 
involved in the industry. In contrast, the neoclassical economists support the position of 
neoliberal, free market policies and competitive advantages that will ultimately result in 
economic growth and population-wide capability improvements for developing nations. A subset 
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of the neoclassical view also reevaluates many critiques from the traditional feminist camp by 
applying a different brand of feminism not biased by Western world experiences. By no means 
are these perspectives exhaustive of all viewpoints on the issue of manufacturing and women’s 
capabilities, nor do contributors to the literature on this subject always fall clearly in one 
category or the other. However, these are the primary ideologies represented in the literature, and 
therefore stand as the parameters of this review. Recognizing this caveat, the issue of whether 
Chinese women have improved their capabilities and quality of life through their participation in 
light manufacturing and export based industry draws distinct lines between the neoclassical and 
feminist schools of economic thought, and is still developing as a subject of research and debate. 
Feminist Economists 
 The most well-known and heavily publicized complaints against factory work for rural 
women are the poor working conditions and low wages. The neoclassical argument states that 
developing countries have a comparative advantage in assembly line production, but this is often 
seen by feminist economists as a deceptive way of portraying special economic zones with lax 
labor laws and tax structures to attract investment. Even though this so-called comparative 
advantage may lead to economic growth for the nation as a whole, the growth is unequal along 
gender lines and women are economically marginalized due to ingrained gender norms (Barker 
and Feiner, 2004). The gender issue with economic growth is not so much that women are unable 
to find wage labor positions; while only a third of rural migrants are women, they compose over 
70% of the migrant work force in export oriented SEZs throughout the country (Jacka, 2000). 
The vast majority of these women are aged sixteen to twenty-five, and are valued for their 
perceived patience, dexterity, and obedience (Davin, 2001). However, despite the increase in 
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women’s wage-earning employment, they are crippled economically due to being stuck in low 
paying, strenuous positions with little opportunity for advancement. 
 In support of this point, former president of the International Association for Feminist 
Economics, Stephanie Seguino, goes as far as to assert that income inequality between men and 
women has been a principle impetus for investment and growth in Asia (2000). Seguino’s 
research reveals that women are generally paid lower wages than men in developing Asian 
countries, even when level of education is taken into account. This is due to stereotypes that lead 
to women’s initial hire into low wage positions, and gender norms that disallow female workers 
from organizing and striving for higher wages. An export function used in this study reveals that 
a decline in female workers’ wages leads to greater access to technology through trade, and 
ultimately greater productivity. Similarly, a greater wage gap leads to a greater profit share of 
income, greater investment spending, and increased productivity. Finally, a regression run 
related to gender wage gaps seems to confirm Seguino’s proposal that a more significant gender 
wage gap stimulates greater growth, even when accounting for education (2000). This research is 
of concern to feminist economists, who interpret the findings as meaning that Asia’s economic 
growth is in fact based in gender based income inequality. This interpretation indicates that it is 
not in the economic interest of Asian countries, including China, to increase the wages of female 
manufacturing workers because it would negatively impact overall economic growth for the 
nation.  
 As Barker and Feiner specify, the cheap labor of women in factories does not just 
translate to low wages, but also to a lack of safety protections, health precautions, and benefits 
(2004). The neoclassical economists argue that factory jobs pay women more than agricultural 
work, but feminist economists counter that this work is done in subpar conditions with wages 
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that are still dismally low (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). The higher pay can also be 
accounted for by extremely long hours rather than higher wages, which negates the comparison 
between agriculture and manufacturing work to some degree (Davin, 2001). There is little room 
for advancement or raises for women on the assembly line, which could balance the negative 
attitudes towards and effects of factory wages and conditions. This is evidenced by the fact that 
only 1% of migrants hold managerial or technical jobs, which represent a higher paygrade than 
that of factory workers (Zhao, 2005). Furthermore, it is fair to assume that of this 1%, a majority 
are male as men are generally considered more capable of filling these roles due to gender 
stereotypes. Researchers such as Tamara Jacka report first-hand accounts of harsh and 
exploitative work and sexual harassment, with statistical reports supporting these allegations 
(2000). In 2010, the China Labor Watch conducted a survey of 46 factories in mainland China 
which reveal and support many of feminist economists’ concerns about wages, working hours, 
and workers’ organization. 
 The three standout areas covered by the China Labor Watch survey are unionization, 
overtime, and wages. In terms of unionization, 88.2% of surveyed factories had no trade union or 
system for workers to report their grievances (2010). This is of concern from a feminist 
economic point of view because it does not allow factory workers, who are majority women, to 
fight for improved conditions or wages. When researching overtime hours, the China Labor 
Watch found that 87% of the surveyed factories had daily overtime that exceeded three hours, or 
did not implement a weekly day off. Furthermore, not a single factory stayed beneath the legal 
maximum of 36 hours of overtime monthly. In fact, all of the factories had over 100 hours of 
overtime per month, and some even exceeded 200 hours (2010). These hours speak to the 
feminist concern for exploitative conditions in export-based manufacturing. The volume of hours 
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also supports the proposition that higher pay in factories is a result of more time worked rather 
than higher wages. This leads to more concern for feminist economists as lower wages can lead 
to lower levels of intra-household bargaining power, even when the great number of hours 
worked is considered (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007).  
 When looking at wages, the China Labor Watch found that 82.6% of the surveyed 
factories do not pay wages in accordance with Chinese laws in regard to minimum wage and 
overtime wages (2010). This statistic indicates that government regulation is not a panacea to 
factory conditions and wages. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the wage gap between urban 
and rural people in China has in fact widened since the mid-1980s, suggesting that the mass 
migration of rural workers to urban areas has not hastened income equality as some 
neoclassicists would like to suggest (Zhao, 2005). The China Labor Watch survey also revealed 
seven severe problem areas in the canvassed factories: occupational safety and protection, social 
insurance, dormitory conditions, labor contract, forced labor, discrimination, and child and minor 
protection (2010). This research, combined with the research and proposals of the above 
literature, suggest that feminist economists are correct in questioning if it is realistic to improve 
working conditions in export oriented industries while simultaneously expanding women’s 
employment in this field (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). 
 In the case of manufacturing, an element of working conditions to be explored is the 
dormitory system. The widespread use of dormitories for factories is often viewed as a way of 
lowering the cost of living in a city for migrant workers, and of providing a safe living space for 
rural women who have never lived alone, let alone in a big city (Ngai, 2007). These positive 
aspects of the dormitory system are used for factory recruitment, and can make the recruitment 
process less daunting both for the migrants and their families. However, they are also used to 
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give the factory greater control over its labor force (Davin, 2001). Factory dormitories are known 
for strict regulations, and these controls help to lengthen the work day and quash calls for higher 
wages. Furthermore, the dormitory system keeps migrants, particularly women, from settling 
down in urban areas. These workers will generally spend only three to five years working in 
industrial areas before returning home, which is ideal for employers who generally prefer young 
women. The dormitory system allows young rural women to work, but the cramped and strict 
communal living system is by no means a positive home environment (Ngai, 2007). The system 
is meant to keep women between worlds, with both the enterprise and the state expecting female 
rural workers to return home after a few years (Davin, 2001). The concept of the dormitory 
system, while convenient for some migrants, supports the feminist economist view that the 
manufacturing industry essentially exploits rural women’s labor, but ultimately expects them to 
return to their rural setting when they are less useful or attractive to employers. 
 Another, less publicized feminist complaint against factory work in China is the strain of 
unpaid care labor and social reproduction. While it is well known that 1978 marked the opening 
of the Chinese economy to the world and a transformation from a socialist to a capitalist 
economy, the effect of this movement on women’s care burden is often left unexamined. These 
types of major economic and social transitions have a tendency to be based in gender-biased 
policies that are ultimately responsible for increasing the care bias and burden for women (Berik, 
Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). Much of this increased burden can be attributed to the fact that 
neoclassical, capitalist economic theory is linked with neoliberal policies that encourage 
economic liberalism and decreased interference from the government, both in terms of the 
market and public works and projects (Barker and Feiner, 2004). Such policies lead to a push for 
the privatization of services such as healthcare, welfare, housing, and education, which are 
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provided by enterprises rather than the government (Davin, 2001). This economic transformation 
and shift of policy fall under what is known as the Washington Consensus, a set of economic 
policies that are supposedly the panacea for developing countries. In summary, the consensus 
touts the Western values of free trade, capital mobility, privatization, and decreased government 
regulation as the path to growth and prosperity. The issue that feminist economists find with this 
plan is that the burden of privatization and public supports falls far more heavily on women than 
men, as women are expected to make up the difference in care formerly provided through 
government services (Barker and Feiner, 2004).  
 Roger Beattie argues that it is far more difficult to achieve universal insurance coverage 
in any nation when a large portion of the urban labor force is participating in the informal 
economy. This is problematic in that the vast majority of jobs created in developing nations are 
part of the informal economy (2000). This contradiction is applicable to the Chinese economy, 
where an enormous portion of the workforce in urban areas is made up of rural migrants in 
flexible, sparsely regulated, and uncontracted, positions. These workers, including the rural 
women in factories, are generally not provided benefits or insurance through their work, leaving 
them without access to coverage. Other results of the move away from a socialist economy 
included the deterioration of the commune based rural healthcare system, more expensive and 
less accessible healthcare, a decline in public care, a rise in the uninsured, and higher fees for 
education (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). While social care was by no means plentiful in 
rural areas before the reform, it decreased even more post-reform, increasing the gap in equality 
between rural and urban China (Davin, 2001). 
 A large part of the burden placed on Chinese women is their traditional duty of caring for 
children and the elderly. The one-child policy in China increased the rigor of this responsibility 
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as the duties related to elder care are generally not split between siblings, but rather fall on the 
shoulders of an only child (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). The weight of this 
responsibility has increased not only due to the lack of government public support for healthcare 
and pensions, but because of the growth of the elderly population. Between 1990 and 2008, the 
percentage of the Chinese population aged above 75 years grew from 1.65% to 3.39% (Cook and 
Dong, 2011). While this shift in population indicates better living conditions and improved 
general health, it also increases the length and types of care that women have to provide for their 
own parents and often for their husbands’ parents as well.  
 In terms of childcare, the pressure for low profits and high margins has led many 
companies to cut back on allowances made for caring labor. This, combined with decreased 
support for maternity leave and childcare, particularly in low-wage jobs, have made it 
exceedingly difficult for rural migrant women to both work and provide adequate childcare 
(Cook and Dong, 2011). This difficulty is compounded by hukou law, a discriminatory issue 
specific to China that supports feminist economist’s concerns about reproductive labor and 
women’s care burden. While hukou was originally meant to restrict mobility within the country, 
it is currently used to ensure that rural migrant workers are entitled to welfare only in their hukou 
area, and that their children are not entitled to a public education outside of their native town or 
city (Jacka, 2000). Two-third of rural children cannot access public education in urban areas, and 
those who can generally pay higher fees than urban children (Shi, 2008). This raises the question 
of how women can provide healthcare, childcare, and education for their children in the cities to 
which they migrate. The answer is often that they simply cannot, and instead leave their children 
home to be raised by relatives. As a result, this “left behind” population frequently faces an 
increased workload to make up for the lost labor of the migrants. This workload often falls 
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disproportionately on women and girls. Furthermore, there is evidence that paid work for rural 
mothers correlates with negative health impacts on children. Given this analysis, feminist 
economists often argue that higher wages do not outweigh the erosion of social protections for 
reproductive and caring labor (Cook and Dong, 2011).  
 As previously mentioned, the hukou system can be viewed as a mechanism for 
reinforcing the most negative aspects of light manufacturing for rural migrant women. The 
system places mobility limitations on migrants, thus preventing them from changing status at 
will and often excluding them from better jobs (Davin, 2001). Outside of these more blatant 
discriminatory elements, Afridi, Li, and Ren’s research suggests that hukou status is internalized 
and causes poorer performance in those with rural hukou. In an experiment in which school 
children were asked to complete puzzles for money, the researchers found that when hukou 
status was made salient, those with lower hukou statuses exerted less effort, even with the appeal 
of a monetary incentive (2015). This discovery suggests that the neoclassical assertion that 
everyone benefits from capitalism and growth is in fact impeded and hindered specifically in 
China by a system that is inherently discriminatory. 
 The above points are the key issues the feminist economists identify with the light 
manufacturing industry in China. This is not to say that every feminist economist opposes the 
industry, or that every feminist approaches the system with equal skepticism. Furthermore, not 
every piece of literature cited is written by a researcher considered to be a feminist economist. 
However, on the whole, all of these issues have been raised by the feminist economist 
community as problems that need remedying, particularly those issues that receive less media 
coverage. To paraphrase Barker and Feiner, the case is not always that feminist economists 
oppose globalization and capitalism on principle, but that they are more apt to be skeptical on the 
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ability of these movements to help everyone equally, particularly when it comes to differences in 
gender (2004).  
Neoclassical Economists 
 In basic terms, neoclassicists believe in the validity of a trade-off between labor standards 
and employment based on the fact that market forces will lead to economic growth and 
ultimately improved labor conditions and wages in the long run (Cagatay, 1996). The significant 
growth in globalized businesses and export manufacturing over the past couple of decades 
speaks to the pervasive nature of this economic theory. Manufacturing increased from 59% to 
74% of total world merchandise exports between 1984 and the mid-1990s, and the vast majority 
of this manufacturing growth has taken place in developing countries (Kabeer, 2004). According 
to neoclassical principles, this increase in manufacturing should ultimately lead to economic 
growth, better working conditions, and finally social growth, for developing nations and their 
people.  
 The key argument in the neoclassical economist camp for manufacturing is that of 
increased wages and incomes for migrant workers, particularly for women. It is difficult to argue 
that factory work does not economically benefit migrants, particularly women, given that 
working in provinces with high levels of foreign direct investment (and specifically for 
enterprises funded through foreign investment) have resulted in higher wages for both genders 
when compared to other regions and enterprises. Furthermore, China has the greatest female 
labor force participation rate and smallest urban gender wage gap among developing nations, 
indicating that women are unquestionably benefiting economically along with their male 
counterparts (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). This is not to say that the economic effects 
of export manufacturing are without flaw. In his book Country Driving, Peter Hessler tells the 
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story of three young women who are able to earn decent wages through factory work and 
ultimately work their way up into more lucrative positions. Nevertheless, Hessler also contrasts 
the benefits of wage increases and opportunity with the increased lack of choice afforded to 
peasants in terms of making a living wage (2010). However, this contrast is often viewed by 
neoclassicists as a series of necessary growing pains in order to reach a greater economic good 
for the nation as a whole. It is also important to note that while wages are low compared to those 
in developed nations, women working in factories do not compare their purchasing power to that 
of the consumers who will ultimately buy the products they make, but to that which they had 
before working in manufacturing. (Chang, 2008). 
 A clear indicator of the recognized economic benefits for migrants working in export 
manufacturing is the rate with which rural youth are choosing migration over farm work. A 2003 
study by Knight and Song indicated that while 97% of rural households receive some income 
from farming, two-thirds of households combine farm and non-farm work. About 37% of rural 
households receive some income from migration, accounting for a large percentage of the non-
farm work performed by rural households. Knight and Song also found that migrants benefit 
from shifting their resources from farming to non-farming activities because non-farming 
activities are more financially rewarding both on average and at the margin. People living in 
rural areas recognize this, which is indicated in Knight and Song’s finding that most rural 
Chinese farmers did not want to increase the size of their farm, even if it was the only way to 
increase income (2003). Farming is rapidly becoming a less attractive economic activity in rural 
China, and export manufacturing provides an outlet for rural people, particularly youth, to enter a 
new, more lucrative industry. 
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 For women particularly, the effects of increased wages and work experience play out 
more pronouncedly when they return to their villages (Davin, 2001). By increasing the 
contribution that they make to their family income and by achieving upward movement in urban 
employment, rural women often gain a position of greater respect within their family units 
(Chang, 2008). Given that at least three-quarters of migrants return to their home villages after 
migrating to urban areas, it is fair to say that a majority of female migrant workers ultimately 
return home. It has also been observed that many of the migrant women returning do so with an 
increased sense of independence and a penchant for challenging traditional gender roles. 
Therefore, the effect of “going-out” and working in urban areas for the families of female 
migrants is greater than simply receiving wages. It is also the basis for the beginning of a long-
term shift of gendered power within the traditional gendered family structure in China (Davin, 
2001).  
The shift of gendered power within households is crucial to development within the 
country as the increased employment and rank of women within household are generally 
expected to reduce fertility, which allows parents to invest more time in each of their children 
(Hare, 1999). This is a relevant change in rural China, where the one-child policy was not as 
strictly enforced as it was in urban China. The increased rank of women within a household is 
also expected to create incentive to invest in the education and well-being of girls (Hare, 1999). 
The effect of increased investment in females, particularly children, is already evident in that 
China has the smallest gender disparities in both adult and youth literacy rates among developing 
nations (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). 
 Despite the persistent evidence of higher wages and bargaining power within the family 
structure, feminist economists and similarly concerned parties, almost always based in the 
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developed western world, often call for a social clause in international trade. Such a clause 
would require the enforcement of minimum labor standards, with the threat of sanctions and 
enforcement by the World Trade Organization. Naila Kabeer, though generally considered a 
feminist as well as an economist, firmly disagrees with the imposing of a mandatory social 
clause on the grounds that it would not ultimately be helpful to factory workers, particularly 
women, employed in developing countries. She argues that the demand for a social clause comes 
from people in developed nations who mean well, but do not understand that the working 
conditions in light manufacturing are far better than the alternatives for women working in the 
export industry (2004). 
The neoclassical framework is consist with Kabeer’s rejection of a hypothetical social 
clause, largely because neoclassicists believes that imposing a mandatory social clause on export 
manufacturing would effectively destroy the comparative advantage that developing nations have 
in assembly line manufacturing. Kabeer argues that those calling for a social clause on minimum 
labor standards should try to consider the “view from below” rather than comparing labor 
conditions in developing nations to those in already developed nations. By this, she means that 
women in developing countries compare their wages and working conditions to those of other 
jobs available to them, not to those of jobs in developing countries. When using this more 
realistic measure, the outlook towards factory conditions is much improved. Kabeer also points 
out that activists in developing nations often fail to distinguish between poor working conditions 
that result from poverty and lack of development and blatant violations of human rights. While 
the conditions in factories in Southern China are not ideal, neoclassical economists would argue 
that this is due to underdevelopment more so than exploitation, and that conditions will 
ultimately improve with further economic development (2004). Though there is room for 
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improvement, neoclassicists believe that protective legislations such as social clause would 
hinder market growth in developing countries and render women the victims rather than the 
benefactors of the regulation (Cagatay, 1996) 
In addition to subpar factory conditions, an undeniable issue for migrant workers is the 
discriminatory hukou system. Neoclassicists recognize that the system permeates the lives of 
migrants in urban areas in a number of ways, including the withholding of welfare, public 
services, and education for rural children. However, it is evident that hukou laws have been made 
progressively less oppressive through reforms resulting from China’s participation in 
manufacturing and the world market. To begin, the hukou food couponing system, which made 
migration next to impossible for rural peasants, was abolished in the 1980s as a direct result of 
the need for labor in the special economic zones (Shi, 2008). Since then, the push of surplus 
labor in rural areas and the pull of high labor demands in urban manufacturing have led to mass 
migration and reforms in hukou law and related discriminatory legislation (Zhao, 2005). There 
have been several reform experiments in regard to hukou and rural migrants in urban areas, such 
as the abolition of fees that are applied specifically to rural migrants, the provision of some 
social security for migrant workers, and increased access to public services, training, and 
education for rural migrants in urban areas (Shi, 2008) 
A major victory for rural migrants was the elimination of urban and rural hukou in 2001 
(Zhao, 2005). Though this reform is not yet nation-wide, it has led to a more prominent 
discussion on the merits and shortcomings of the hukou system, and has undoubtedly caused the 
system to be rendered less rigid in consideration of the massive influx of migrants over the past 
two and half decades. In more recent reforms, the Chinese government announced in 2015 that it 
will be providing 13 million people hukou rights who have up until now been denied public 
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services and education due to their lack of hukou registration. Many of these “black children” 
were secondary children born under the one-child population policy (Dong and Hunt, 2015). Due 
to less rigid enforcement of the policy in rural areas than urban, it can be inferred that a large 
number of people being awarded these rights are rural. Through these reforms, the rural Chinese 
are slowly but surely being awarded more rights, recognition, and welfare by the government. 
Reforms and social improvements can be accredited to China’s fairly newfound need for rural 
migrants in its cities, and the neoclassical principal that economic growth will ultimately lead to 
social growth as well. 
One of the arguments explored in the previous section that feminist economists have 
against the supposed positive effects of globalization and manufacturing is that most migrant 
women still return home to their village and marry after working for a few years. They claim that 
this pattern indicates no long term change in traditional gender roles as a result of factory work. 
It is true that most women hope to marry following participation in factory work, and research of 
female migrant workers revealed that choosing one’s own husband was considered the most 
attractive aspect of migration. However, it is crucial to note that a collectivist society such as 
China does not value the same kind of independence that is considered typical in the developed 
world. The fact that rural women aspire to get married is not a symbol of oppression but of 
cultural preference. Marriage actually represents a form of independence for women in Chinese 
society because being married means being independent from one’s natal home and family rather 
than being a life-long dependent. Marriage is strongly associated with adulthood for rural 
Chinese women, and to stay unmarried would essentially leave them in a state of perpetual 
childhood (Fang, 2012).  
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A persistent desire for rural Chinese women to marry does not indicate that participation 
in manufacturing has had no impact on the traditional institution. Migration to urban areas has 
provided many rural women a means of escape from unwanted betrothals.  There is also 
evidence that migrant women are generally able to delay marriage from their early twenties until 
their late twenties, when they have developed increased worth to their families and independence 
through manufacturing work. Participating in this work can also increase women’s bride value, 
giving them an opportunity for a more fortuitous marriage arrangement than they would have 
made otherwise (Davin, 2001). 
Romantic love has also found a spot within the new class of young rural migrants. As the 
migrants have become more exposed to the modern urban middle class, they have begun to 
emulate the desire for affection and romance in marriage rather than aspiring to business-like 
couplings arranged by their parents. The shift towards romantic relationships has also permeated 
the dating sphere for rural migrants. While casual dating is still frowned upon, it is no longer 
scandalous or immoral for a woman to lose her virginity before marriage as long as marriage is 
proposed soon thereafter (Fang, 2012). Some migrants even participate in dating services while 
living in urban areas, taking their marriage prospects into their own hands (Chang, 2008). While 
the views and traditions surrounding Chinese marriage can certainly seem unequal for women on 
a western scale, it is unreasonable to expect them to change rapidly due to their deep roots in 
Chinese history. However, the past two and half decades have shown the beginnings of change in 
women’s approach towards marriage that are far more favorable for women than was the case in 
the past. 
Another issue related to Chinese women and marriage is divorce. While not at all 
uncommon in the United States, it was highly stigmatized in China until fairly recently. 
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However, this began to change when China opened its economy to the rest of the world, and 
divorce rates began to rise drastically as the effects of globalization took place. While divorce 
was initially and still is more common in cities, rates have also risen in rural areas throughout the 
country. Furthermore, as of 1994, more than 70% of divorces in China were initiated by women. 
This statistic is indicative of the new social and economic freedom and independence 
experienced by women during the globalization period. Newfound empowerment has led women 
to demand more out of their marriages (Faison, 1994). Just as Chinese women are demanding 
romance when they begin their marriages, they are demanding that romance and fair treatment 
continue throughout the remainder of their marriage, demonstrating a power shift within the 
traditional gender balance of marriage. 
Contemporary Feminists 
As mentioned previously, many feminist economist concerns about export manufacturing 
and globalization come from a place of altruism and true concern. However, these concerns also 
often come with a western bias and an “us” and “others” mindset (Rofel, 1993). Jocelyn Guilbert 
claims that westerners, and Americans in particular, have redefined proper feminism as being 
similar to American gender standards, and that anything that varies from this standard is 
considered backwards and wrong, specifically when it comes from the non-white developing 
world. This brand of thinking is what leads many American feminists to view Chinese women, 
especially the rural poor, as helpless victims of poverty and oppression. While many of these 
women are in fact poor even by Chinese standards, it is often not in the manner or to the degree 
professed by American feminist. Guilbert also complains that Western media chooses to focus 
only on the issues facing the third world, many of which have existed for long periods of time, 
rather than progress (1998). However, a new brand of feminism has begun to emerge that aligns 
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more closely with neoclassical ideals and attempts to evaluate issues in developing countries 
without western bias.  
This new brand of feminism, which will be referred to as contemporary feminism within 
the context of this paper for the purpose of differentiating if from traditional feminist economics, 
focuses on evaluating women’s issues and empowerment within the framework of their own 
cultures. Academics who fall under this umbrella do not argue that there shouldn’t be research 
and literature regarding feminism in developing nations, but rather that there should not be a 
strict definition of feminism and liberation (Rofel, 1993). One of the greatest differences 
between the contemporary feminist and the traditional feminist economists is that the 
contemporary feminists base their beliefs heavily on first-hand accounts from women living in 
the country being studied. Naila Kabeer claims that portraying third-world women as helpless 
victims of an exploitative system fails to give any credit to the women themselves. She contends 
that “simply highlighting their problems, and ignoring their gains, erases the possibility that there 
may have been a calculus of choice involved and that women may consider these jobs worth 
defending” (2004). With this in mind, contemporary feminists tend to adhere to neoclassical 
principles in that they recognize the gains afforded to women in third-world countries through 
globalization and manufacturing despite the issues that still need to be addressed in the future. 
Contemporary feminists are quick to point out that rural Chinese youth are eager to 
migrate to urban areas to find work. These youth do not identify with the farming lifestyle, and 
there are studies that suggest that the majority of rural youth would prefer to be employed in a 
city job than a rural job, even if compensation was the same (Fang, 2011). Leslie Chang offers 
similar findings in her book Factory Girls, in which she describes the experiences of several girls 
working in export manufacturing, and specifically of two young rural women working in 
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Dongguan over the course of three years. Chang states that the majority of rural female workers 
in Dongguan had chosen to “go out” and migrate of their own volition in search of freedom and 
self-improvement rather than having been forced to go for economic reasons. She also 
emphasizes the opportunities for advancement for rural women through participation in 
industrialization and light manufacturing, but warns that advancement is highly dependent on 
self-motivation, determination, and taking risks. The two women that Chang interacted with 
most frequently, Wu Chunming and Lu Qingmin (Min), were both able to rise in station both 
within their factories and their families during the three years in which the book takes place. 
However, advancement and higher wages were the direct result of taking classes, acquiring 
skills, and taking risks by jumping factories. Contemporary feminists argue that focusing on the 
negative aspects of manufacturing diminishes the gains that women such as Chunming and Min 
have worked so hard to achieve, and misrepresents a system that, though not perfect, has 
provided many opportunities for rural women as a whole. 
A final aspect that fuels contemporary feminism and links it to neoclassical economics is 
representation. As has been alluded to above, many of the criticisms that globalization and 
neoclassicists alike face is their representation as exploitative. However, contemporary feminists 
claim that this narrative is strongly shaped and influenced by unequal representation based on 
world power, and an insistence on victimizing politics “Others” (Rofel, 1993). Naila Kabeer goes 
as far as to say that people from third-world countries used in promotional material in the 
developed world are coached using “intensive educational technique” to create a narrative that is 
helpful and supportive of the movement or ideals being pushed by the socially motivated 
organization (2004). From this coaching comes the story of oppressed rural Chinese women 
being used and mistreated by evil multinational corporations. Contemporary feminist reject this 
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narrative, which has been largely embraced by traditional feminist economists, and instead 
embraces a narrative shaped by progress and the benefits achieved by rural female migrants, who 
certainly do not see themselves as victims. For this reason, contemporary feminist have moved 
away from the traditional views of feminist economics and have aligned themselves with the 
principles of neoclassicists.  
Conclusion 
Though outsourcing manufacturing to developing countries has become a staple in 
western economies, it is still a topic of fierce ethical debate. China has proven to be a centerpiece 
of this debate given its rapid expansion in the past two and a half decades, and the significant 
number of rural Chinese women who currently participate in light manufacturing for the purpose 
of export. The two primary sides of the Chinese manufacturing debate have emerged as 
traditional feminist economists and neoclassical economists, with contemporary feminists 
aligning most closely with neoclassical economists. 
In short, traditional feminist economists believe that increased wages are not enough to 
consider light manufacturing beneficial for Chinese women. They believe that the lack of public 
services, poor working conditions, and absence of consideration for unpaid caring labor render 
manufacturing as exploitative and as increasing gender inequality within the country. 
Neoclassicists argue that economic growth through manufacturing will lead not only to better 
wages but ultimately to social growth for the entire nation. Contemporary feminists support this 
view based on first-hand encounters with Chinese women who value their work and the 
independence which they have gained. Having now explored the current literature and ideas 
surrounding light manufacturing and its effects on rural Chinese women, it is prudent to design a 
25 
 
means of measurement to ascertain the true benefits that Chinese women have gleaned from 
participation in light manufacturing. 
Statistical Analysis 
Methodology: 
 In order to test the hypothesis that migration and factory work have a positive impact on 
the lives and social development of rural Chinese women, I ran three multivariate regressions 
using the data analysis software StatCrunch. The data used represents the years 1990-2010 and 
was gathered from GapMinder, the National Bureau of Statistics of China, and the government 
websites for the cities of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. In these regressions 
three different dependent variables are used to proxy the parameters of the Human Development 
Index (HDI). The HDI was established in 1990 by Pakistani economist Mahbub UI Haq and 
further developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen. The index has three dimensions: having a 
healthy life, being knowledgeable, and maintaining a decent standard of living. These 
dimensions are measured using life expectancy at birth, years of education (mean for adults over 
25 and expected for school children), and gross national income per capita. The calculated HDI 
values for China are not included in the regressions because consistent data for the years 1990 to 
2010 is not available. Therefore, I substituted life expectancy, GNI per capita based on 
purchasing power parity (yuan), and years in school for women ages 15 through 44 as my 
dependent variables. 
 For each regression I used six independent variables, some of which measured the impact 
of migration and factory work and others which were specific to questions about women’s status. 
For each regression, I used the two proxy HDI variables that were not serving as the dependent 
variable as independent variables since they are inarguably measures of human development. 
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Years of women’s education is more specifically an indicator of women’s development and 
increased social status. I used the average wage of staff and workers in manufacturing (yuan) to 
reflect the impact of wage level on human development, especially because the vast majority of 
rural migrant women are employed in manufacturing. I used foreign direct investment net inflow 
of as a percentage of GDP because of the tendency of light manufacturing work to be related to 
foreign companies and investments. To proxy the growth of migration, for which numbers are 
inconsistent at best, I took a weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth for four Chinese 
cities with significant migrant populations: Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. This 
number serves as the approximation for migrant volume between 1990 and 2010. The final 
independent variable is total fertility. A lower level of fertility is generally associated with higher 
levels of education and resources for children, resulting in improved human development. 
Though China is notorious for its one-child policy, the vast number of loop holes and special 
conditions in this policy allow fertility to be a valid measure in this study (Cai, 2010). 
Results: 
In the first regression (Table 1), the dependent variable years in school for women aged 
15 to 44 is regressed against the average wages of staff and workers in manufacturing, GNI per 
capita at PPP, life expectancy, total fertility, foreign direct investment net inflow of as a 
percentage of GDP, and the weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth from the four 
proxy cities. The statistics that proved to be significant (at a significance value of p=0.05) were 
average wages of staff and workers in manufacturing with a p-value of 0.0184, total fertility with 
a p-value of 0.0011, GNI per capita at PPP with a p-value of 0.0118, and life expectancy with a 
p-value of <0.0001. Foreign direct investment and weighted average GDP were not found to be 
significant. Average wages and life expectancy had positive coefficients of 0.000092257879 and 
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0.34558754 respectively, while total fertility and GNI per capita at PPP had negative coefficients 
of -0.32602968 and - 0.00038717695. This regression had an adjusted r-squared value of 0.9984. 
In the second regression (Table 2), I regressed life expectancy against the average wages 
of staff and workers in manufacturing, years in school for women aged 15 to 44, GNI per capita 
at PPP, total fertility, foreign direct investment net inflow of as a percentage of GDP, and the 
weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth from the four proxy cities (Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai). The statistics that proved to be significant were the average 
wages of staff and workers in manufacturing with a p-value of 0.0399, years in school of women 
with a p-value of <0.0001, GNP/capita at PPP with a p-value of 0.0184, and total fertility with a 
p-value of 0.009. Foreign direct investment and weighted average GDP growth were not found to 
be statistically significant. Years in school of women, GNI/capita at PPP, and total fertility had 
positive coefficient values of 2.7429559, 0.0010364504, and 0.78873697, respectively while 
average wages had a negative coefficient of -0.00023232759. This regression had an adjusted r-
squared value of 0.9982 
 In the third regression (Table 3), I regressed GNI per capita at PPP against the average 
wages of staff and workers in manufacturing, years in school for women aged 15 to 44, life 
expectancy, total fertility, foreign direct investment net inflow of as a percentage of GDP, and 
the weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth from the four proxy cities. The statistics 
that proved to be significant were the average wages of staff and workers in manufacturing with 
a p-value of >0.0001, years in school for women with a p-value of 0.0118, life expectancy with a 
p-value of 0.0184, and foreign direct investment with a p-value of .0418. Total fertility and 
weighted average GDP growth were not found to be statistically significant. Average wages, life 
expectancy, and foreign direct investment had positive coefficients of 0.2479811, 345.86741, 
28 
 
and 41.213636. Years in school for women had a negative coefficient of -1025.4898. This 
regression had an adjusted r-squared value of 0.999. 
Discussion 
 In Table 1, the regression data indicates that average wage of staff and workers in 
manufacturing, total fertility, GNI per capita at PPP, and life expectancy are the independent 
variables that have a statistically significant impact on years in school for women ages 15 to 44. 
The statistical significance of average wages contradicts the feminist economist view that 
increased wages are a shallow measurement of human development and female social 
development. Rather, it seems that manufacturing wages have a significant correlation with 
increased education for Chinese women. This supports the contemporary feminist view that the 
wages earned in factories are a key stepping stone to human, and specifically women’s, 
development, which is strongly represented in education as one of the three factors of the HDI 
indicator. In addition, life expectancy has an extremely high statistical significance in this 
regression. This is to be expected as both variables are considered to be direct measurements of 
human development, and should thus should be highly correlated. 
 Total fertility in this regression has a negative coefficient of -.32602968, which is to be 
expected and supports the contemporary view of factory labor. This coefficient indicates that a 
decrease in total fertility has a significant impact on increased education. It is generally accepted 
that increased education and decreased fertility because of educated women’s ability to pursue 
more opportunities in addition to childrearing (Cohen, 2013). Therefore, women’s reduced 
fertility as a result of later marriage due to manufacturing work results in an increased number of 
years in school for women, improving their social status.  
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 Surprisingly, GNI per capita has a negative coefficient in this regression. It stands to 
reason that as societies become wealthier, they invest more money into education, especially 
given that average wages have a positive coefficient in this regression. However, the coefficient 
for this variable is exceedingly low at -0.00038717695, thus indicating that is not practically 
significant. This negative coefficient can also be attributed to the fact that the original women 
who entered factories in the 1990s were not generally further educated as a result of their factory 
employment. It is their daughters who would benefit from an increased GNI per capita. 
Therefore, the increased education for women is not consistent over the two decades, and is more 
heavily concentrated toward the latter half of this time span. The high r-squared value of this 
regression indicates that the data was a very close fit to the statistical model in this regression. 
 In Table 2, the regression shows that the average wage of staff and workers in 
manufacturing, years in school for women ages 15 to 44, GNI per capita at PPP, and total 
fertility have a statistically significant impact on life expectancy. Years in school has a 
statistically and practically significant relationship with life expectancy. Given that both are 
typical measurements of human development, this is unsurprising. Additional education leads to 
more lucrative opportunities for women, which lead to healthier lifestyles. Furthermore, 
Regression 1 indicates that the average wages in manufacturing have a significant positive 
relationship with women’s education. Therefore, the increase in education resulting from 
manufacturing wages also correlates with a longer lifespan. Both increased education and a 
longer lifespan are inarguably positive benefits that seem to stem from manufacturing wages, 
supporting the neoclassical and contemporary feminist outlook on manufacturing employment. 
 GNI per capita is positively correlated with life expectancy, which is indicative that the 
rising wealth in the country, largely stemming from exports, is leading to healthier lifestyles. 
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This is an expected result as increased disposable income can be used on a number of life 
improving products and services including healthier foods, improved medical care, and improved 
domestic sanitation. However, total fertility is surprisingly also positively correlated with life 
expectancy, indicating that increased fertility leads to a longer life expectancy. It would 
generally be assumed that fewer pregnancies would lead to longer lives for women. This 
unexpected correlation can potentially be explained by the fact that healthcare measures have 
improved internationally and in China over the past two decades, allowing for safer childbirth 
and fewer deaths related to childbirth. This would make total fertility a less significant 
determinant of life expectancy for women. 
Average wages is the only variable that has a negative coefficient, and thus a negative 
impact on life expectancy. This was a surprising outcome, and stands contrary to reason given 
that greater wages traditionally result in increased health standards and thus a longer life 
expectancy. This unexpected data can be explained in two fashions. The first explanation is that 
while the variable has a statistically significant p-value, its coefficient is extremely low at 
0.00023232759. This indicates that the variable is in fact not practically significant in its 
relationship to life expectancy.  
The second explanation for the low average wages coefficient relates to the minimum 
wage in China. Though minimum wages were first introduced in China in 1993, they were 
generally not applied to migrant labor and penalties for ignoring minimum wage laws in 
manufacturing were minimal. It was not until 2004 that minimum wage reforms were passed, 
resulting both in a rise in minimum wage and more significant enforcement of minimum wage 
(Mayneris and Poncet, 2014). Migrant workers, and thus female factory workers, were 
disproportionately affected by the lax minimum wage laws between 1993 and 2004. The impact 
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of their lower buying power due to lower wages and higher purchase prices could very likely be 
the cause of the negative coefficient of average wages in this regression. Furthermore, data after 
2004 should likely show a positive correlation between average wages and life expectancy. 
Overall, this regression has data that is extremely fit to the statistical model as indicated by its 
high r-squared value. 
In Table 3, the data indicates that average wage of staff and workers in manufacturing, 
years in school for women ages 15 to 44, life expectancy with projections, and net flows of 
foreign direct investments as a percentage of GDP have a statistically significant impact on GNI 
per capita at PPP. Average wages has an extremely significant relationship with a p-value of less 
than 0.0001. This close relationship makes sense as the majority of those involved in 
manufacturing are China’s rural poor. Given that manufacturing wages are significantly higher 
than those available in rural areas, mass access among the poor to these heightened wages would 
have a significant positive impact on the country’s GNI, and thus also it’s GNI per capita.  
Years in school for women has an extremely high coefficient with a value of 1025.4898. 
Past research has shown that educating women leads to growth both in a nation’s GDP and that 
employing more women leads to an increase in per capita income (Matsui, 2013). Given that the 
wages in manufacturing are allowing more girls and women to be educated, this should lead to 
more women in financially lucrative and socially powerful roles in the future. Therefore, the GNI 
per capita should continue to rise significantly with the projected increased education for 
females. Life expectancy also has a particularly high coefficient in this regression with a value of 
41.213636. This can likely be explained by the fact that a longer life expectancy leads to more 




The last statistically significant variable in this regression is foreign direct investment. 
This is not surprising as FDI and GNI have an intimate and connected relationship. Foreign 
direct investment has spurred and funded many of the manufacturing and exporting opportunities 
in China. This investment not only leads to huge revenues through the export of products, but 
also through the creation of millions of direct and indirect jobs, and thus, wages. The economic 
activity created through foreign direct investment directly impacts the increase in GDP and 
national wages, and thus GNI and GNI per capita. 
Conclusion 
 The question of whether rural Chinese women’s participation in light export 
manufacturing helps or hinders, empowers or exploits, is much debated. The vast majority of 
literature regarding this subject is qualitative, and clearly divided between the neoclassical and 
feminist economist camps. Through my quantitative statistical analysis, I proved my hypothesis 
that migration and factory work have a positive impact on the lives and social development of 
rural Chinese women, supporting the neoclassical and contemporary feminist views regarding 
manufacturing participation. 
 The most influential discovery in my research is that the average wages of staff and 
workers in manufacturing is statistically significant and has a positive correlation in all three of 
the regressions. This indicates that the wages provided by manufacturing labor play a significant 
role in increasing life expectancy, GNI per capita, and women’s education. This relationship 
alone disproves the crux of traditional feminist argument against manufacturing work. The 
significance of the average wages variable in all three regressions shows that the wages provided 
by manufacturing are not the sole benefit of manufacturing, nor are they a hollow measurement 
of development and improvement. Wages provided by manufacturing are instead, as indicated by 
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the neoclassical economists and contemporary feminists, a necessary vehicle for improving 
women’s status and human development in China.  
 It must be acknowledged that traditional feminists are correct in their belief that 
manufacturing work and the resulting increased wages are not an overnight solution for all of 
China’s gender-based issues. However this research indicates that in the past twenty years, the 
work and wages provided by manufacturing have allowed women to seek more education, which 
will allow them to gain more influential positions in society and in their professional lives. The 
benefits of manufacturing have also allowed the Chinese people to increase their personal 
incomes, and thus have more disposable income to spend on both luxuries and improved 
personal care and extend their lives. Based on the correlation of manufacturing work and wages 
with the variables composing the Human Development Index, it is clear that neoclassical 
economists and contemporary feminists are correct in their belief that light export manufacturing 
is a source of empowerment and opportunity for China, especially for rural Chinese women. 
Limitations 
 The first limitation I faced in this study was difficulty finding data. While the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China has census reports dating back to 1996, the categories of 
information and methods of measurement provided from year to year are inconsistent. I also 
encountered language barriers in finding information, particularly when trying to find data for 
rural provinces. Another limitation was the extremely high r-squared values of the regressions, 
indicating an unusually high correlation among the variables. This indicates that unaccounted 




Future Work  
 As stated above, the vast amount of literature regarding the subject of rural Chinese 
women’s participation in light export manufacturing is qualitative in nature. For this reason, it is 
crucial that future work include a more in-depth quantitative analysis of the issues surrounding 
this phenomenon. An important question to be asked regarding this subject is the impact on the 
children of female migrant workers. The migrants of the 1990s are now old enough to have 
children who are old enough to have gone to college or be employed. Researching the degree of 
benefit that these children have experienced from their mothers’ participation in manufacturing 
















Multiple linear regression results:  
Dependent Variable: Years in School Women 15-44 
Independent Variable(s): Average Wage of Staff and Workers in Manufacturing (yuan), Total Fertility 
(number of children), GNI/capita PPP, Life Expectancy with projections, Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP), Weighted Average % GDP Growth 
 
Parameter estimates:  
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. Alternative DF T-Stat P-value 
Intercept -16.938746 1.6281431 ≠ 0 13 -10.403721 <0.0001 
Average Wage of Staff and 
Workers in Manufacturing 
(yuan) 
0.000092257879 0.000034250784 ≠ 0 13 2.6935991 0.0184 
Total Fertility (number of 
children) 
-0.32602968 0.078630691 ≠ 0 13 -4.1463413 0.0011 
GNI/capita PPP -0.00038717695 0.00013233035 ≠ 0 13 -2.9258363 0.0118 
Life Expectancy with 
projections 
0.34558754 0.022463941 ≠ 0 13 15.384101 <0.0001 
Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows (% of GDP) 
0.010963857 0.012878586 ≠ 0 13 0.8513246 0.41 
Weighted Average % GDP 
Growth 
-0.0022798099 0.0021849983 ≠ 0 13 -1.043392 0.3158 
 
Analysis of variance table for multiple regression model:  
Source DF SS MS F-stat P-value 
Model 6 15.720956 2.6201594 1998.5253 <0.0001 
Error 13 0.017043603 0.0013110464   




Summary of fit:  
Root MSE: 0.036208374 
R-squared: 0.9989 




Multiple linear regression results:  
Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy with projections 
Independent Variable(s): Average Wage of Staff and Workers in Manufacturing (yuan), Years in School 
Women 15-44, GNI/capita PPP, Total Fertility (number of children), Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP), Weighted Average % GDP Growth 
 
Parameter estimates:  
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. Alterna
tive 
DF T-Stat P-value 
Intercept 50.226951 1.469938 ≠ 0 13 34.169434 <0.0001 
Average Wage of Staff and 
Workers in Manufacturing 
(yuan) 
-0.00023232759 0.0001017633 ≠ 0 13 -2.2830196 0.0399 
Years in School Women 15-44 2.7429559 0.17829809 ≠ 0 13 15.384101 <0.0001 
GNI/capita PPP 0.0010364504 0.00038455172 ≠ 0 13 2.6952172 0.0184 
Total Fertility (number of 
children) 
0.78873697 0.25713228 ≠ 0 13 3.0674367 0.009 
Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
-0.034759069 0.03601224 ≠ 0 13 -0.96520155 0.3521 
Weighted Average % GDP 
Growth 
0.0067830818 0.0061259632 ≠ 0 13 1.1072678 0.2882 
 
Analysis of variance table for multiple regression model:  
Source DF SS MS F-stat P-value 
Model 6 112.79022 18.798371 1806.5143 <0.0001 
Error 13 0.13527644 0.01040588   





Summary of fit:  
Root MSE: 0.10200921 
R-squared: 0.9988 




Multiple linear regression results:  
Dependent Variable: GNI/capita PPP 
Independent Variable(s): Average Wage of Staff and Workers in Manufacturing (yuan), Years in School 
Women 15-44, Total Fertility (number of children), Life Expectancy with projections, Foreign direct 
investment, net inflows (% of GDP), Weighted Average % GDP Growth 
 
Parameter estimates:  
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. Alternative DF T-Stat P-value 
Intercept -17030.278 6570.29 ≠ 0 13 -2.5920131 0.0223 
Average Wage of Staff and Workers in 
Manufacturing (yuan) 
0.2479811 0.010533 ≠ 0 13 23.543254 <0.0001 
Years in School Women 15-44 -1025.4898 350.4946
1 
≠ 0 13 -2.9258363 0.0118 
Total Fertility (number of children) -153.84375 190.2946
4 
≠ 0 13 -
0.80845023 
0.4334 
Life Expectancy with projections 345.86741 128.3263
6 
≠ 0 13 2.6952172 0.0184 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) 
41.213636 18.25182
8 
≠ 0 13 2.2580553 0.0418 
Weighted Average % GDP Growth -4.6676473 3.468167
5 
≠ 0 13 -1.3458541 0.2014 
 
Analysis of variance table for multiple regression model:  
Source DF SS MS F-stat P-value 
Model 6 62933438 10488906 3020.5796 <0.0001 
Error 13 45142.258 3472.4814   





Summary of fit:  
Root MSE: 58.927764 
R-squared: 0.9993 
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